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BOOKS 
Reviewed 
Toward Meaningful Protection of Worker 
Health and Safety 
Joseph A. Page* 
ExPENDABLE AMERICANS. By Paul Brodeur. New York: Viking Press. 1974. 
274 pages. $8.95. 
MuscLE AND BLooD. By Rachel Scott. New York: E. P. Dutton. I974· xii + 
306 pages. $8.95. 
In the annals of job health and safety, 1974 was a signal year. It pro-
duced an epidemic of occupational liver cancer associated with vinyl chlo-
ride/ disclosure of a plan to soft-pedal federal regulation of industrial 
hazards in return for contributions to the 1972 Nixon reelection campaign/1 
and the publication of a brace of exposes decrying the human toll taken 
by workplace perils. These events furnish hard evidence that the bright 
hopes raised by passage of the landmark Occupational Safety and H ealth 
Act of 19708 remain far from fulfillment. 
In the search for reasons for this ostensible failure, two books present 
appropriate starting points. Paul Brodeur's Expendable Americans• and 
Rachel Scott's Muscle and Blood5 illumine patterns of indifference and 
• B.A. I 955, LL.B. I958, LL.M. I964, Harvard University. Professor of Law, Georgetown Uni-
versity. 
1. On January 22, I974, the B.F. Goodrich Company announced that several employees at its 
plastics factory in Louisville, Kentucky, had died from angiosarcoma, a rare and fatal form of liver 
cancer. The workers had been exposed to vinyl chloride, a colorless gas used in the production of the 
solid plastic, polyvinyl chloride. S~e OSHA, Preamble to Emergency Temporary Standard for Ex-
pomrt: to Vinyl Chloride, 39 Fed. Reg. I2342 (I974). In the entire United States, the death toll 
from angiosarcoma had been averaging about 2I per year. See Saar, Vinyl Chloride and Cancer, 
Washington Post, May 5, I974, § C, at 2, col. I . At the Goodrich plant there were 4 fatalities in 5 
years. By late I974• a worldwide total of 26 angiosarcoma cases among vinyl-chloride workers had 
been uncovered. See Kramer, Vinyl-Chloride Risks Wert: Known by Many Before First Death.r, Wall 
St. J., Oct. 2, I974, at 1, col. I. In addition, employees producing finished goods from polyvinyl chlo-
ride, such as floor tile and fabrics, have suffered both liver cancer and serious but noncancerous liver 
disease. See Kramer, Death of 2 Polyvinyl Chloride Workers From Rare Type of Cancer is Verified, 
Wall St. J., June I4, I974, at 8, col. I; Kramer, Sdentists Hear Reports That Vinyl Chlorid~ May Be 
More Dangerous Than Realized, Wall St. J., May I3, I974, at 8, col. 3· 
2. St:~ Randall, Worker Safety and Politics, Washington Star-News, July I5, I974, §A, at I, col. I. 
3· 29 u.s.c. §§ 65I-78 (I970). 
4· Hereinafter cited asP. BRODEUR. 
5· Hereinafter cited as R. Scorr. 
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reckless disregard toward job health and safety by both government and 
industry. The authors focus primarily upon the years following enactment 
of the 1970 law. Fired by indignation in the muckraking tradition, the 
efforts of Brodeur and Scott seek to attract attention to a social issue that, 
despite its awful dimensions, has never enjoyed a prominent place on the 
public agenda.6 The books complement each other nicely, with Brodeur's 
etching in great detail the development and enforcement of federal stan-
dards regulating worker exposure to asbestos dust and Scott's weaving a 
patchwork of vignettes that stress the human side of occupational disabil-
ity. Yet both books are flawed, not only as exercises in popular journalism 
but also in their contribution toward understanding the obstacles to signif-
icant reductions in job accidents and diseases. They shrink from some of 
the really difficult, complex problems and fail to analyze or even suggest 
alternative strategies for achieving acceptably safe and healthful working 
conditions. 
This Review will attempt a critical assessment of Expendable America1u 
and Muscle and Blood, elaborating on one of the critical dilemmas that the 
books only lightly touch upon and commenting briefly on some sources 
for possible improvement in the workplace environment. No definitive 
solutions will be offered; indeed, none may exist. However, this Review 
will suggest some action that may be taken to pierce the veil of neglect that 
has long shrouded the protection of worker health and safety. 
I. AssEssMENT OF THE ExPos:Es 
Paul Brodeur's repore limns in somewhat personalized terms the au-
thor's study of the responses of industry, government, medicine, and labor 
to the health hazards of asbestos dust-a subject Brodeur previously pur-
sued at some length in both artide8 and book form.9 Although the author 
digresses to explore other aspects of occupational health regulation, the 
major portion of the book chronicles events following the discovery that 
workers at a Texas asbestos-insulation factory were being exposed to harm-
ful quantities of asbestos dust and describes the promulgation of a federal 
standard for acceptable asbestos dust levels 1under the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act. 
Although the deleterious effects of asbesltos dust upon the human lung 
6. A 6-month survey by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in 1971 uncovered an estimated 3.1 mil-lion job injuries and illnesses and nearly 4,300 work-related deaths in the nonfarm sector during the 
survey period. See 1973 PRESIDENT'S REPORT ON OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 5· The 1972 
Report stated that "there may be as many as 1oo,ooo deatths per year from occupationally caused 
diseases." 1972 PRESIDENT'S REPORT ON OCCUPATIONAL SAFE~ry AND HEALTH III. 
7· Brodeur's account first appeared as a 5-part series i!n the New York,er. See Brodeur, Annals 
of Industry-Casualties of the WorkPlace, NEw YoRKER, Oct. 29, 1973, at 44; id., Nov. 5, 1973, at 
92; id., Nov. 12, 1973, at 131; id., Nov. 19, 1973, at 87; id., Nov. 26, 1973, at 126. 8. Brodeur, The Magic Mineral, NEw YoRKER, Oct. 12, 1968, at 117. 
9· P. BRODEUR, AsBESTOS AND ENZYMES (1972). 
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have long been recognized, the actual scope of the health hazard did not 
become evident until Dr. Irving Selikoff of the Mount Sinai Environmen-
tal Sciences Laboratory began to study asbestos workers in 1962. Examin-
ing live workers over a period of time and researching the medical records 
of deceased workers, Dr. Selikoff found not only high levels of lung scar-
ring, or asbestosis, but also an alarming incidence of lung cancer and me-
sothelioma (a rare cancer of the pleural linings of the lung and chest). 
Brodeur recounts the reactions of company officials of an asbestos-insu-
lation plant in Tyler, Texas, and of the then federal Division of Occupa-
tional Health10 to the grim discoveries being made and publicized by Dr. 
Selikoff and his associates and to reports that the levels of asbestos dust in the 
Tyler factory exceeded what were then deemed safe limits. The company 
took air samplings and conducted studies that were both bungled by incred-
ible omissions and invested with a minimal sense of urgency. The federal 
agency directed its energies solely to data collection and took no interest 
in devising ways to protect the workers. In 1¢9, pursuant to their respon-
sibilities under the Walsh-Healey Act,11 Department of Labor inspectors 
visited the plant, took air samples without proper measuring equipment, 
recommended the issuance of respirators to employees and improvements 
in ventilation, but failed to follow up to determine compliance. In 1971, 
two doctors newly appointed to the National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health (NIOSH)-formerly the Division of Occupational 
Health-discovered the data their agency had been gathering and became 
alarmed over its implications. Frustrated in their attempts to interest the 
Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) in taking enforcement action under the 1970 Act, they notified 
union officials, who in turn demanded a N IOSH12 inspection of the Tyler 
factory and a medical examination of the workers. The NIOSH survey 
concluded that a grave health crisis existed at the plant. OSHA inspectors 
then visited the facility. Although their .findings did not contradict those 
of N IOSH, they proposed fines of only $210 for nonserious violations of 
the Act.13 Subsequent pressure by the union and publicitv over working 
conditions at the plant helped to provoke a decision by the company in 
early 1972 to close down the Tyler installation. 
ro. The agency was later to become the Bureau of Occupational Safety and Health and then the 
National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health. For a description of this agency and a critique 
of its past performance, see J. PAGE & M. O'BRIEN, BITTER WAGES 88- 94, 197--99 (1973). 
II. Act of June 30, 1936, ch. 881, 49 Stat. 2036. The Act covered work being performed under 
certain federal contracts and required that working conditions be safe and healthful. The only sanc-
tion the Act imposed was denial of future federal contracts to violators. On the Labor Department's 
administration and enforcement of the Act, see J. PAGE & M. O'BRIEN, supra note 10, at 94-104. The 
Walsh-Healey Act has been superseded by the Occupational Safety and Health Act. See 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 653(a), (b)(2) (1970). 
12. For a discussion of the different functions performed by OSHA and NIOSH see text accom-
panying notes 32-34 infra. ' 
I 3· OSHA requires the issuance of a citation for non serious violations "in situations where an 
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As the controversy over the situation in Tyler intensified, a petition 
from the Industrial Union Department of the AFL-CIO forced OSHA 
to initiate rulemaking proceedings for the development of a new exposure 
standard for asbestos dust. Brodeur describes in detail several sessions of 
the public hearing during which union officials and scientists argued for 
a standard of two fibers per cubic centimeter of air, to be reduced to zero 
at a later date, while industry urged that the level be set at five fibers. Bro-
deur effectively demonstrates a link between the asbestos industry and 
both a Canadian scientist who testified as a purportedly independent wit-
ness in favor of the 5-fiber standard, and Arthur D. Little, Inc., a private 
consulting firm engaged by OSHA to study the economic impact of the 
various proposed standards. Indeed, the author's analysis of what he terms 
the "medical-industrial complex"14-the subtle (and not so subtle) inter-
relationships among industry, the medical and scientific communities, and 
government-is one of the strengths of the book.16 
Expendable Americans is devastating as a case study of the Tyler affair, 
instructive as far as it delves into the setting of the asbestos standard, and 
incomplete as an overall picture of job health regulation. The timing of 
events unfortunately prevented Brodeur from making use of the revelation 
that the former Assistant Secretary of Labor in charge of OSHA, in re-
sponse to a White House request that federal agencies and departments 
consider how they might help reelect Richard Nixon in 1972, had formu-
lated a scheme whereby OSHA would refrain from setting health standards 
objectionable to industry, in return for corporate campaign contributions.16 
In addition, the dramatic discovery that occupational exposure to vinyl 
chloride gas can cause a rare form of liver cancer17 occurred too late for 
inclusion except in the Epilogue. 
Brodeur's approach is chronological and virtually that of a diarist; he 
records the progress of his own investigations and discoveries and does 
not hesitate to meander into other related occupational health matters. Un-
fortunately, he seldom attempts to put his observations in perspective.18 
As a result, his style, when combined with occasional lapses into excessive 
detail, risks losing readers unfamiliar with the subject. Moreover, although 
incident or occupational illness resulting from violation of a standard would probably not cause death 
or serious physical harm but which have a direct or immediate relationship to the safety or health of 
employees." OSHA, CoMPLIANCE OPERATIONS MANUAL VIII-6 (1972). 
14. P. BRODEUR at 154· 
1 5· It is instructive to compare this analysis with a recent opposing argument that warns of the 
growing power of the "regulatory-medical complex," which it defines as "a loose but not un-
coordinated network of regulatory agencies, government research institutes, academic medical teams, 
labor unions, and other groups united by a common commitment to eradicate environmental causes 
of disease." Weaver, On the Horm of the Vinyl Chloride Dilemma, FoRTUNE, Oct. I974, at ISO, 
202-0 4. 
16. See Randall, supra note 2. 
I7. See note I supra. 
I 8. The book provides occasional compensations, such as the dramatic effect of the culmination 
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the book stores a wealth of information, the publisher's failure to provide 
an index makes access to this valuable material difficult. 
While Expendable Americans will especially delight the cognoscenti, 
Muscle and Blood seeks to aim shock waves at a more general readership. 
Rachel Scott marshals a series of case studies in an attempt to convey a 
sense of the "massive, hidden agony of industrial slaughter in America."19 
Having visited the sites of a number of workplace catastrophes, she pre~ 
sents a victim'Hye view of the physical consequences of job accidents and 
illnesses and of the financial constraints imposed by the inadequacies of 
worker's compensation. On the other hand, curtains of corporate secrecy 
frustrated her efforts to obtain industry's side of the story. She corroborates 
Brodeur's argument for the existence of a "medical~industrial complex" 
through her incisive discussion of the Industrial H ealth Foundation, an 
organization funded by industry to conduct "independent" scientific re~ 
search that invariably serves the purposes of its sponsors.20 
Nevertheless, when she turns from specific facts to broader issues, Scott's 
argumentation becomes diffuse and loses impact. She fails to capitalize on 
the outrage generated by her vignettes by directing it toward positive s~ 
lutions. Thus she scores state regulation of occupational safety and health 
in a manner more appropriate to the period before the 1970 Act took effect, 
without discussing the effect the new law is having and can have upon the 
states.21 Moreover, her generalized comments on OSHA and NIOSH are 
not conducive to an understanding of what can be accomplished within 
the present legal and administrative framework. Too often her generalized, 
polemical prose masks a failure to offer concrete proposals, as exemplified 
by her concluding point that"[ o ]nly the American people themselves have 
the power to bring about the changes that can stop this industrial rna~ 
sacre."22 
II. CoNTROVERSY OVER CosT 
A shortcoming common to both the Brodeur and Scott books is their 
failure to present comprehensive looks at the issues involved in assessing 
cost of compliance. In his account of OSHA's asbestos rulemaking, Br~ 
of the author's persistent, unsuccessful attempts to obtain information from the medical director of 
the parent corporation owning the Tyler factory. As recounted at the end of the book, Brodeur finally 
met the director face-to-face and asked to interview him concerning the health problems of the men 
at the T yler plant. The doctor refused, stating: "It's a question of the patient's rights." P. BRODEUR 
at 245· The "patient" to whom the doctor was referring was his corporate employer. 
19. Dust jacket toR. ScoTT. 
20. See also J. PAGE & M. O'BRIEN", mpra note 10, at I 53-54. 
21. See 29 U.S.C. § 667 (1970). See also J. PAGE & M. O'BRIEN, supra note 10, at 210-21 ; Brown, 
Stau Plans under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 38 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoB. 745 
(1974); Seymour, Forging a Partnership with the States, MoNTtn.Y LABOR REv., Aug. 1973, at 28; 
Sheehan, OSHA and State fob Safety Plant, MoNTHLY LABOR REv., Apr. 1974, at 44; Comment, An 
Alternative to Federal Preemption: The Washington Plan, 9 GoNZAGA L. REv. 615 (1974). 
22. R. ScoTT at 296. 
This content downloaded  on Mon, 7 Jan 2013 16:43:39 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27: Page 1345 
deur discusses the agency's consideration of costs in formulating its final 
regulation. He accepts the contention of union officials who argued that 
cost of compliance should be totally irrelevant to the development of health 
standards, and he attacks both the merits and the conflict-of-interest aspect 
of the Arthur D. Little study commissioned by OSHA to analyze the eco-
nomic impact of various asbestos-dust exposure limits. The cost issue is, 
however, far more complicated than Brodeur implies and therefore de-
serves more detailed analysis. 
The legal argument for inclusion of a cost factor in promulgating in-
dustry health regulations hinges on vague phraseology in the 1970 Act. 
When the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare considered the 
bill, Senator Jacob Javits secured the adoption of an amendmene3 that, 
as it emerged in the final version of the law, required OSHA to weigh the 
"feasibility" of health standards2~ and to promulgate standards that would 
protect the health of employees "to the extent feasible."2 ~ The legislative his-
tory sheds little light on what Congress actually intended by these terms.26 
Other language in the Act is equally unhelpful. The purpose of the 
1970 Act is to "assure so far as possible every working man and woman in 
the Nation safe and healthful working conditions."27 The term "occupa-
tional safety and health standard" is defined as a standard incorporating 
requirements "reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or health-
ful employment." 28 Since absolute safety and health would compel the 
cessation of all work activity,29 the limitations imposed on the scope of 
federal regulation by the phrases "so far as possible" and "reasonably nec-
essary" are vague indeed. The lack of congressional guidance for resolving 
issues of economic feasibility is particularly deplorable in light of the pre-
cision of other federal safety statutes on this point. 80 
23. SeeS. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1970). 
24. 29 u.s.c. § 655(b)(5) (1970). 
25. I d. (emphasis added). No similar mandate attached to the imposition of safety standards. 
26. The House version contained no similar qualification. The Conference Committee adopted 
the Senate language. See H.R. REP. No. 1765, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1970). 
27. 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1970). 
28. ld. § 652(8). 
29. See G. CALABREsJ, THE CosTS OF AcciDENTS 17-18 (1970). 
30. For example, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1391 (r) (1970), 
the Consumer Product Safety Act, I 5 U.S.C. § 2056(a) (Supp. III, 1973), and the National Mobile 
Home Construction and Safety Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 603(8), 88 Stat. 700 (Aug. 22, 
1974), seek to eliminate "unreasonable" risks of harm. The same acts also expressly mandate con-
sideration of costs. See 15 U.S.C. § 2058(c)(1)(C) (Supp. III, 1973) (Consumer Product Safety Act); 
Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 6o4(f)(4), 88 Stat. 701 (Aug. 22, 1974) (Mobile Home Act). See also 15 
U.S.C. § 1392(a) (1970), which requires that federal motor vehicle safety standards be "practicable." 
On the basis of strong legislative history, the term has been interpreted to encompass consideration of 
economjc factors. See H & H Tire Co. v. United States Department of Transp., 471 F.2d 350, 353 
(7th Cir. 1972). In addition, both the Mobile Home Act and the 1974 Amendments to the Traffic 
Safety Act require manufacturers who wish to contest proposed standards on the basis of economic 
burden to submit cost data to the agency. See Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 6o7(a), 88 Stat. 703 (Aug. 22, 
1974) (Mobile Home Act); Pub. L. No. 93- 492, § 105, 88 Stat. 1470 (Oct. 27, 1974) (Motor Ve-
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While the feasibility language of the 1970 Act could be narrowly con-
strued to apply only to technological capacity to reduce harmful exposures, 
OSHA has taken a more expansive view, asserting that the language also 
entails reasonableness of costs.51 In support of its position, OSHA has 
pointed to the statutory division of function between itself and NIOSH. 
The latter agency develops criteria documents recommending standards 
for exposure to toxic substances and harmful physical agents.52 OSHA has 
responsibility for promulgation of the ultimate standard.55 According to 
OSHA, this division of functions indicates a difference in the considera-
tions appropriate to determinations by each agency: NIOSH recommends 
on the basis of what would theoretically be best for the health of the worker, 
and OSHA adds the "feasibility" factor.8~ 
The agency, of course, cannot by itself construe the legislative meaning, 
and recently the judiciary has begun the task of resolving the issue. In In-
dustrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson 85 the Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia reviewed the asbestos standard and held, inter 
alia, that the considerations underlying the regulation "could properly 
include problems of economic feasibility."86 As a matter of statutory con-
struction, the court found that "Congress does not appear to have intended 
to protect employees by putting their employers out of business-either by 
requiring protective devices unavailable under existing technology or by 
making financial viability generally impossible."87 
The court's delineation of the circumstances under which cost consid-
erations may properly affect a health standard qualifies this broad proposi-
tion. The mere fact that a standard may financially burden an employer 
or reduce profits would not, in the court's view, be relevant. The court 
added: 
Nor does the concept of economic feasibility necessarily guarantee the existence 
of individual employers. It would appear to be consistent with the purposes of the 
Act to envisage the demise of an employer who has lagged behind the rest of the 
hicle Amendments). Thus, the standard-setting process created by these statutes encompasses an 
approach analogous to the determination of unreasonable, and hence negligent, conduct at common 
law, whereby the extent and gravity of the risk arising from a particular activity or aspect of an 
activity is balanced against the cost of avoiding the risk and the utility of any conduct terminated in 
order to avoid the risk. Su W. PRossER, Tm: LAw oF ToRTs 146-49 (4th ed. 1971). s~~ also Posner, 
A Theory of N~gligence, I J. LEGAL STUDIES 29,32- 33 (1972). Where risk outweighs cost of avoidance 
and utility, it is deemed unreasonable. Such a finding would also justify the promulgation of a safety 
standard designed to put an end to unreasonable risks. 
31. See J. PACE & M. O'BRIEN, supra note 10, at 235· 
32· s~o9 u.s.c. §§ 669(a)(2)-(3), 669(a)(7)(e) (1970). 
33· &e id. § 655. 
34· s~~ Statement of John H. Stender, Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and 
Health, Hearings on Occupational Safety and H~alth Act Rfview Before the Subcomm. on Labor of 
the Senat~ Comm. on Labor and Public Wdfare, 93d Cong., zd Sess. 228 (1974). 
35· 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
36. Id. at 477· 
37· I d. at 478. 
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industry in protecting the health and safety of employees and is consequentially 
financially unable to comply with new standards as quickly as other employers.38 
However, where enforcement of a standard might have a substantial ad-
verse impact upon all but a few of the companies affected or might cause 
the shutdown of an entire industry, OSHA "could properly consider that 
factor." 89 This analysis would seem to imply that the agency would have 
discretionary authority to close down an industry, provided that it had duly 
taken into account the economic consequences. The opinion thus is unfor-
tunately schizophrenic, for it provides the contradictory assertions that 
OSHA must not put employers out of business and that OSHA must 
merely consider costs in making a decision that might put individual em-
ployers out of business. 
The Fifth Circuit in dictum has suggested a somewhat different anal-
ysis. In its review of OSHA's emergency temporary standard for pesticides, 
it stated that "[ t )he promulgation of any standard will depend upon a 
balance between the protection afforded by the requirement and the effect 
upon economic and market conditions in the industry."'0 This analysis 
suggests that OSHA must weigh risks against costs in every case, and thus 
could cause the shutdown of entire industries in certain circumstances. 
Though more coherent than the standard set forth in Industrial Union, 
the Fifth Circuit's formulation provides little more concrete guidance to 
OSHA. 
The agency has, for its part, insisted that its responsibility in setting 
health standards includes consideration of economic impact as a factor, 
though not an overriding one. But exactly how OSHA fits cost into the 
equation remains a mystery. In developing final regulations for worker 
exposure to asbestos dust,41 14 carcinogenic substances;2 and vinyl chloride 
gas,43 the agency had economic-impact studies prepared. However, the final 
regulations provide little indication of the precise weight to be given to 
costs, or even identification of these relevant costs." OSHA seems content 
38. !d. 
39· ld. (emphasis added). 
40. Florida Peach Growers Ass'n, Inc. v. Department of Labor, 489 F.2d 120, 130 (5th Cir. 1974). 
In its attack on OSHA's vinyl chloride standard, industry argued both economic and technological 
infeasibility. The Second Circuit upheld the standard. Society of the Plastics Industry, Inc. v. Occu· 
pational Safety & Health Administration, 509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1975). The opinion addresses 
technological considerations at length but avoids any separate treatment of the financial burden of 
compliance. 
41. For an analysis of the economic-impact statement used in the asbestos proceedings, see P. 
BRODEUR 145-54, 164-71. 
42. The economic-impact statement used in the development of the carcinogen standards is dis-
cussed in Page & Munsing, Occupational Health and the Federal Government: The Wages Are Still 
Bitter, 38 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRos. 651,663-64 (1974). 
43· Su OSHA, Vinyl Chloride: Availability of Final Economic Impact Study, 39 Fed. Reg. 33009 
(19?4). 
44· The preamble to the asbestos standard states merely that "the delay in the effective date of 
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to cloak its use of costs with the mantle of policy judgment in order to 
shield itself from judicial scrutiny!~ Yet the specific facts supporting these 
judgments do not appear in the preambles to the final rules. 
It is true that the weighing of the cost factor involves abundant uncer-
tainty. Consider, for example, the difficulty in assessing the economic im-
pact of a health standard that industry claims will terminate the manufac-
ture of a widely used product. How are such claims to be evaluated? Of 
what import is the possibility that a business might move overseas in order 
to escape the costs of regulation? To what extent may OSHA call upon 
industry to develop new technology that will permit affordable compliance 
with a new health standard re If a toxic substance is found to be so haz-
ardous that an entire industry would have to cease production in order to 
eliminate the risk, how should OSHA measure the cost of the shutdown ? 
Should not OSHA discount this cost if any part of the business may be 
converted to another type of production? How should the general eco-
nomic climate-in particular, problems of unemployment-at the time of 
decision affect a standard ? 
Further, how can such decisions be made without a quantification of 
the 2-fiber standard will provide all employers a reasonable time to comply." OSHA, Standard for 
Exposure to Asbestos Dust, 37 Fed. Reg. II318, II319 (1972). The preamble to the carcinogen stan· 
dard mentions the argument that it would not be feasible to administer a regulation setting a zero 
tolerance level and requiring a permit system for the use of the chemicals; however, the only specific 
factor mentioned to support OSHA's decision not to adopt a permit system is: "The investigations and 
evaluations of thousands of work situations involving a carcinogen, and the completion of the proce· 
dures, possibly including hearings, for the granting of the permits, would require many years and the 
diversion of substantial resources, even if available, from other serious occupational safety and health 
problems." OSHA, Occupational Safety and Health Standards: Carcinogens, 39 Fed. Reg. 3756, 3758 
(1974). The preamble to the vinyl chloride standard devotes several paragraphs to a discussion of 
technological feasibility without specifying costs. OSHA, Standard for Exposure to Vinyl Chloride, 
39 Fed. Reg. 35890,35892 (1974). 
It is instructive to compare OSHA's perfunctory discussions of costs with the detailed factual 
analysis of the economic feasibility of abatement of the discharge of asbestos-like fibers into Lake 
Superior, in United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. II (D. Minn.), motion for stay granted, 
498 F.2d 1073 (8th Cir.), application to vacate stay denied, 95 S. Ct. 287 (1974), aff'd as modified, 
No. 74-1291 (8th Cir. March 14, 1975), application to vacate stay pending appeal denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 
3527 (U.S. Mar. 31, 1975). 
45· Section 6(b) of the Act permits OSHA to promulgate occupational safety and health stan· 
dards through informal rulemaking procedures. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (1970). However, upon review 
by a federal court of appeals, the test is whether OSHA's determinations are "supported by subs tan· 
tial evidence in the record considered as a whole." ld. § 655(£). In applying this test, one court has 
stated: "What we are entided to at all events is a careful identification by the Secretary, when his 
proposed standards are challenged, of the reasons why he chooses to follow one course rather than 
another. Where that choice purports to be based on the existence of certain determinable facts, the 
Secretary must, in form as well as substance, find those facts from evidence in the record. By the 
same token, when the Secretary is obliged to make policy judgments where no factual certainties exist 
or where facts alone do not provide the answer, he should so state and go on to identify the considera· 
tions he found persuasive." Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 475-76 
(D.C. Cir. 1974). See also Associated Indus. of N.Y. State, Inc. v. Department of Labor, 487 F.2d 342 
(2d Cir. 1973); Note, Judicial Review Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act: The Substan-
tial Evidence Test as Applied to Informal Rulemaking, 1974 DuKE L.J. 459· 
46. TheTraffic~afetyAct, 15 U.S.C .. § 1391(1) (1970),asamended, 15 U.S.C. § 1391(1) (Supp. 
~II, I97_3), has been tnterpreted to authonze the ISSuance of safety standards requiring improvements 
tn ex1sttng technology or the development of new technology. See Chrysler Corp. v. United States Dep't 
ofTransp., 472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1972). 
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the risks involved? Decades may pass before an industrial disease manifests 
itself.'7 Causal relation is often uncertain and may derive from statistical 
association rather than a precise understanding of etiology.48 Should OSHA 
take into account who is going to bear the costs if the relevant risks do 
cause harm? Inadequacies in workers' compensation coverage for occupa~ 
tional illnesses often force employees to shoulder much, if not all, of the 
economic burden. 49 
An additional complication inherent in the use of the cost factor is the 
degree to which industrial risks extend beyond the workplace. The spouses 
and children of workers exposed to asbestos dust may develop lung cancer 
and other asbestos~related lung problems by inhaling asbestos fibers caught 
in the workers' clothes.50 Toxic substances endangering the work force 
may also threaten the community~at~large if they escape into the surround~ 
ing environment.51 Where an occupational health standard carries with it 
both the reduction of risks to persons other than workers and the threat 
of financial debilitation of an industry, it would be a feast of unreason for 
OSHA, in any balance of risks against costs, to ignore the benefits or losses 
that would accrue to nonworkers. But the perimeters of the workplace 
limit OSHA's jurisdiction. 
None of these difficulties seems to trouble OSHA, for it has made no 
real attempt to calculate the weight of the risk factor. Like mercury on 
a windowpane, economic impact remains an elusive element on the list 
of determinants for health standards. OSHA invokes costs with solemn 
regularity but struggles to maximize the discretionary aspect in its use. 
Most disturbing is the agency's having been caught playing politics with the 
cost factor, thereby casting an ominous shadow over the legitimacy of its 
exercise of "discretion." The final report of the Senate Select Committee to 
investigate Watergate, released in mid~1974, described a June 1972 mem~ 
randum written by George Guenther, then Assistant Secretary of Labor 
for Occupational Safety and Health, which detailed how OSHA might 
assist in the effort to reelect Richard Nixon.52 The scheme provided, in 
part, that "no highly controversial standards (that is, cotton dust, etc.) . .. 
be proposed by OSHA or by NIOSH."53 The memo stressed "the great 
potential of OSHA as a sales point for fund raising and general support 
47· See gtnerally Mancuso, Medical Aspects of Occupational Diseaus, 19 0RJO ST. L.J. 612, 622-
25 (1958). 
48. ld. at 615-22. 
49· See grotra/ly THE REPORT OF TRE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON $TATE WoRKMEN's CoMPENSA· 
TION LAWS 17-22, 35-39 (1972). 
50. Ste Brody, Canctr Found in Asbestos Workers' Kin, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1974, at I, col. 5· 
51. See, e.g., Htaring on Vinyl Chloride Before the Subcomm. on Environment of the Senate 
Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. IIO, at 64- 74 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Vinyl 
Chloride Hearing]. 
52. S. REP. No. 981, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 431-33 (1974). 
53· Id. at 432. 
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by employers."5' The Committee found that no action had ever been taken 
to implement the plan.55 Nonetheless, the incident does illustrate the state 
of mind of the person who was in charge of OSHA and was exercising 
broad discretion in weighing the cost-of-compliance factor. 
Other manifestations of attitudes similarly disquieting have surfaced. 
Laurence Silberman, Undersecretary of Labor and the person for whom 
Guenther had written his memorandum, reacted to its disclosure by ex-
plaining that "it would have been perfectly legitimate to say that OSHA 
would more nearly balance the relative interests of workers and employers 
under a Republican than under a Democratic Administration."56 In addi-
tion, closely following release of the Guenther memo carne reports that 
OSHA had been pressuring NIOSH to omit recommendations for specific 
exposure levels in its criteria documents.57 Since OSHA standards, with 
their incorporation of the cost factor, had invariably watered down 
NIOSH's recommendations, it was clear that OSHA was concerned about 
its public image.58 But by keeping from public view the NIOSH recom-
mendations, which are concerned solely with maximizing worker protec-
tion on the basis of scientific and medical data, OSHA would also be hiding 
the extent to which optimum worker protection has been sacrificed in order 
to reduce adverse economic impact upon industry. 
The foregoing discussion points to a potential for, if not a record of, 
abuse deriving both from the vagueness of the statutory definition of the 
cost factor and from an expansive grant of discretionary authority that can 
mask political machination. The questions left unanswered by the cryptic 
language of the 1970 Act involve policy considerations that cry out for 
careful scrutiny by Congress. At the very least, the law should be amended 
to spell out the precise factors OSHA must take into account in balancing 
the economic burden imposed by a standard against the human costs of 
not setting the standard, as well as the relative weight to be given each 
factor. It is crucial that congressional feet be put to the fire in delineating 
the exact circumstances under which worker health is to be sacrificed for 
economic reasons. Indeed, a full grasp of the implications of delegating 
to OSHA authority to condemn workers to industrial disease because the 
costs of avoidance are excessive might provide impetus for additional fed-
eral legislation lifting from workers the economic burdens of occupational 
disability. 
54· ld. at 433· 
55· ld. 
56. Randall, Labor Dtp't Hit on Politics in Worktr Safety, Washington Star-News, July 16, 
1974, § A, at 5, col. I. 
57· Ste Jackson, Agtncy Push to Dilute Job Safety Cittd, Washington Star-News, July 17, 1974, 
S A, at 4, col. :2. 
58. One reporter has quoted a Labor Department official as saying that the NIOSH standards 
"have put us into a public relations box." Burnham, Brtnnan Defends Job Safety Aides, N.Y. Times, 
July :23, 1974, at 5, col. I. 
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III. FURTHER PRoPosALS FOR ACTION 
Though the vinyl chloride epidemic attracted substantial publicity in 
19'J4J59 other oxninous disclosures have underscored the hydra-headed na-
ture of job health hazards. For example, the Allied and Dow Chemical 
Companies reported high levels of lung and lymphatic cancer among work-
ers handling inorganic arsenic, a chemical widely used in the production of 
pesticides, ceramics, glass, and certain medicines. 60 An estimated 1.5 mil-
lion workers may be directly or indirectly exposed to this risk.61 Experi-
ments have associated liver cancer in rats with exposure to vinylidene chlo-
ride, a component of plastic wrappings for food.62 Exposure to anesthetic 
gases is the suspected cause of abnormally high rates of various diseases 
found in a nationwide survey of men and women who work regularly in 
hospital operating rooms. 68 The cumulative impact of these findings, to-
gether with the factual material in the two books under review, point 
strongly to a conclusion that little significant progress has yet been made 
in stemming the health threat posed by toxic industrial chemicals. 
The struggle for safe and healthful working conditions covers many 
fronts and has engaged many combatants. Federal and state agencies, pri-
vate industry, organized labor, and the medical and scientific communities 
have all participated. And all come under attack from Brodeur and Scott 
for permitting in some fashion the continuing crisis in the workplace. Both 
authors take aim at doctors and scientists who place loyalty to a corporate 
employer above professional responsibility for the health of employees. 
Expendable Americans reflects upon and criticizes the performances of 
NIOSH and OSHA in the Tyler, Texas, episode and the development of 
the asbestos standard. Brodeur supplies useful, if limited, insights into 
NIOSH's institutional impotence and OSHA's lack of commitment to 
worker health and safety.64 Scott finds fault with both government and 
labor, though her criticism is superficial and impuissant. 
But Brodeur and Scott neglect two additional input sources, Congress 
and the legal profession. In the years following passage of the 1970 Act, 
Congress has had the task of appropriating funds for its administration 
and enforcement, overseeing OSHA and NIOSH, and amending the Act 
where it has proved inadequate. The legal profession possesses great poten-
59· See note I supra. . . . 
6o. See Burnham, High Levels of Cancer Are Found tn Arsemc Workers, N.Y. Ttmes, Aug. 30, 
I974, at I3, col. I; Richards & Scott, Arsenic, Industry and Cancer, Washington Post, Jan. 12, I975, 
§ B, at 5, col. I. 
61. See Burnham, supra note 6o. 
62. See Kilborn, Cancer Fear Cited for a 2d Chemical, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1974, at 39, col. 8. 
63. See Cohn, Anesthetic Gases Linked to Many Ills, Washington Post, Oct. I5, I974. § A, at 
r, col. I. Higher incidence rates were found for cancer, liver and kidney diseases, spontaneous abor-
tions, and birth defects. 
64. For further development of this point, see Page & Munsing, supra note 42, at 654-66. 
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tial for affecting the success of the Act. While an in-depth analysis of the 
contributions of Congress and the legal profession to the cause of job health 
and safety would be beyond the scope of this Review, some preliminary 
observations upon certain aspects of their record are useful. 
A survey of legislative activity relating to workplace hazards over the 
past 3 years leaves the dominant impression that Congress has reacted much 
more vigorously to industry complaints (especially those of small business) 
concerning the alleged inconvenience and unreasonable expense of the 
1970 Act65 than to reports of newly discovered dangers gravely threatening 
worker health. As a practical matter, this response is not surprising, since 
the immediate and particularized burden the Act imposes on individual 
companies furnishes them with a strong incentive to pressure Congress. 
On the other hand, the constituency mobilized by the risk of an insidious 
disease that may afflict an indeterminate number of workers in 10 or 20 
years is apt to be limited and a good deal less vocal. 
As a result, prolabor elements in both the Senate and House have had 
to fight a defensive battle to fend off legislation designed to meet industry 
demands at the expense of worker protection. Thus in May 1974, the Sen-
ate rejected by only seven votes an amendment that would have softened 
the 1970 law by making discretionary rather than mandatory the imposi-
tion of civil penalties for serious violations and by eliminating civil penal-
ties for nonserious violations.66 In 1972, however, both the House and 
Senate succeeded in tacking onto appropriations bills amendments exempt-
ing small businesses from job safety and health regulation,67 only to be 
thwarted by presidential vetoes directed at other aspects of the legislation. 58 
The political composition of the incoming 94th Congress, the state of 
the economy, and the legislative priorities of organized labor are among 
the factors that will determine whether the Congress in the current session 
will display greater sensitivity to the safety and health needs of workers. 
This Review has earlier suggested that congressional attention be directed 
at the tradeoff between worker protection and costs of compliance in the 
setting of health and safety standards. Two other improvements to the safe-
guards afforded by the 1970 Act also merit specific mention. 
A controversy growing out of the vinyl chloride episode suggests the 
desirability of an amendment imposing on industry a mandate to report 
immediately to NIOSH and OSHA the discovery of any substantial hazard 
65. See generally Hearings on Small Btuiness and the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 
1970 Be/ore the Subcomm. on Environmental Problems Affecting Small Business of the House Select 
Comm. on Small Business, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); Hearings on the Implementation of the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act Be/ore the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor 
and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). 
66. See 120 CoNe. REc . S 7294- 309 (daily ed. May 7, 1974). 
67. See uS CoNe. REc. 2II02-o4, 22713-37,31307-20,33438-49 (1972). 
68. See id. at 28415, 37203. 
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to workers from a toxic substance or physical agent. The chemical industry 
was aware in I9'JI that high concentration:s of vinyl chloride could cause 
tumors in laboratory animals.69 In late I9'J2, Italian industry-sponsored ex-
periments revealed liver and kidney tumors in rats exposed to the chemical 
at a level as low as 250 parts per million (250 ppm).70 At that time the legal 
exposure standard in effect in the United States was 500 ppm.71 On July 17, 
1973, a delegation from the Manufacturing Chemists Association (MCA), 
the chemical industry trade association, met with NIOSH personnel to 
discuss the status of research on the toxicity of vinyl chloride. The Associa-
tion claims that its representatives informed NIOSH of the incidence of 
tumors at exposures of 250 ppm/2 while N IOSH officials stoutly deny that 
this information was ever transmitted.78 N IOSH took no action until early 
1974, when the first worker fatalities were announced.H Testimony at a con-
gressional hearing in August 1974 tends to S1Upport NIOSH's version of the 
dispute.76 Another allegation of data suppression came to light in October 
1974, when the Ralph Nader-funded Health Research Group charged that 
until 1971 a Philadelphia company withheld from its employees and gov-
ernment officials knowledge of the carcinogenicity of a chemical used at 
its plant, even though the company knew int njj7 that the substance might 
cause lung cancer.76 
Other federal safety legislation could s;erve as models for disclosure 
amendments to the 1970 Act. Under the Consumer Product Safety Act, 
whenever the manufacturer, distributor, or .retailer of a consumer product 
has reason to believe that the product is crea1ting a substantial hazard to the 
public, he must notify the Consumer Product Safety Commission.71 Con-
gress has imposed similar reportorial requurements on the manufacturers 
of motor vehicles78 and mobilehomes.79 Cleady workers have no less urgent 
69. Su Kuttner, Vinyl Chlorid~ Link to Cane" Know:n in 1971, R~port Says, Washington Post, 
Sept. 5, 1974, ; A, at 2, col. I. s~~ also Mintz, Ch~mical Hazard K~pt Quiet, Washington Post, May 
20, 1974,; A, at 16, col. I. 
70. Su Klamer, Vinyl· Chloride Riiks W~re Known by Many Be/or~ First D~aths, Wall St. J., Oct. 
2, 1974, at 22, col. 3· 
71. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.93• table G-1 (1974). 
72. Su Manufacturing Chemists Ass'n, Rdease No. 38·46, Vinyl Chloride Chronology, undated, 
at 9 (copy on file with author). 
73· Su Vinyl Chlorid~ H~an'ng, supra note 51, at 56-57 (testimony of Dr. Marcus Key, Di· 
rector of NIOSH). 
74· s~e id. 
75· Se~ id. at 83-93 (Sen. Tunney's questioning of Dr. Theodore Torkdson, representing the 
MCA). 
It is unfortunate that the opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upholding 
OSHA's vinyl chloride standard recites MCA's version of th•e chronology and accepts at face value its 
claim to have notified NIOSH on July 7, I973· Society of th•: Plastics Ind., Inc. v. Occupational Safety 
& Health Ad., 509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1975), af1f1lication for stay denied sub nom., Firestone Plastics 
Co. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 43 U.S.L.W. 3527 (Marcin 31, 1975). 
76. s~~ Hricko & Pertschuk, Cancer in the Workplac<:: A Report on Corporate Secrecy at the 
Rohm and Haas Company, Health Research Group, Oct. 2, :1974 (copy on file with author). 
77- 15 U.S.C.; 2064(b) (Supp. III, 1973). 
78. 15 u.s.c. § 1402 (1970). 
79· Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 615, 88 Stat. 709 (Aug. 22, 1974). 
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a need than consumers for the protection that prompt government aware-
ness of substantial risks would provide. 
Congress should also give priority to devising methods of preventing 
the use of new substances and processes until their safety has been estab-
lished. Each year industry introduces soo to 6oo new toxic substances into 
the stream of production. 80 Yet these chemicals need not under present law 
be tested prior to use, even though workers might inhale, ingest, or other-
wise absorb them. It took an outbreak of peripheral neuropathy, a serious 
nerve disorder, at an Ohio factory to precipitate research leading to the 
discovery of the harmful effects of methyl n-butyl ketone, a solvent used in 
the production of printing inks.81 The Senate version of the Toxic Sub-
stances Act of 1973 would have mandated safety pretesting for certain new 
industrial chemicals.82 Unfortunately, the bill never emerged from a House-
Senate conference in I974· It has been revived in the current session.88 
While Congress can make dramatic changes in the statutory protection 
afforded workers, it remains for the legal profession to ensure the practical 
application of such changes. The dictates of the dollar allocate the deploy-
ment of most legal talent. Thus, under the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act, those with a substantial economic stake (namely, companies cited for 
violations of the Act or industries affected by proposed standards) do not 
hesitate to hire top legal talent to represent them. Though the Act offers 
some unique opportunities for workers to participate in its administration 
and enforcement,8• it does not provide for payment of legal fees to attorneys 
representing workers in the vindication of their rights under the Act.8G 
Therefore, individual employees or labor unions must pay their own law-
yers. The workers' and unions' lack of immediate financial incentive and 
funds for this kind of legal representation has resulted in a distinct im-
balance of forces. 
Admittedly, some affluent unions could devote more resources to the 
legal struggles over job health and safety. On the other hand, the great 
majority of American workers do not belong to trade unions86 and do not 
So. See GENERAL AccoUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE SENATE CoMMITTEE ON LABOR AND PuB-
LIC WELFARE: SLOW PROGRESS LIKELY IN DEVELOPMENT OP STANDARDS FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND 
HARMFUL PHYSICAL AGENTS FOUND IN WORKPLACES I6 (I973). 
Sr. See Wall. St. J., July I5, I974, at 15, col. I. See also R. SCOTT at 9I-97· 
S2. S. 426, 93d Cong., xst Sess. § 5 (I973). 
S3. S. 776, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (I975). 
S4. The I970 Act provides, inter alia, that employees may require NIOSH to evaluate the toxic 
effects of a substance found fn a workplace, 29 U.S.C. § 669(a)(6) (I970), petition OSHA for the 
develop~e!lt of~ standard, td. § 655(b~(I), request OSHA compliance investigations, id. § 6~ 1(f), 
and partiCipate m enforcement proceedmgs before administrative law judges and the Oceupat10nal 
Safety and Health Rev~ew ~~ssion to contest the period of time granted by OSHA to employers 
for the abatement of v10lat1ons, td. § 659(c). For a general discussion of employee rights under the 
Act, see J. PAGE & M. o ·BRIEN, supra note xo, at IS5-S9. 
S5. Attorney's fees may be awarded to consumers who sue for the private enforcement of certain 
rules or orders under t~e Consumer Produer Safety Act. See I5 U.S.C. § 2073 (Supp. III, I973). 
S6. It has been estimated that 2o-25% of the work force is unionized. See J. PAGE & M. O'BRmN 
supra note I o, at II 5· ' 
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deserve to reap the fruits of this neglect. Thus it is arguable that the legal 
profession has some responsibility to help ;assure that the cause of work-
place survival has adequate representation. So-<:alled "public interest law-
yers"87 could redress part of the advocacy imlbalance, if ways could be found 
to put public interest work on a financially viable footing.88 
The law schools harbor another source of legal talent that could be 
enlisted. Students could provide legal assistance (and perhaps even repre-
sentation) to workers willing to intervene: in enforcement proceedings. 
They could also involve themselves in the administrative process on the 
federal and state levels. OSHA has a staff of attorneys who churn out regu-
lations setting safety and health standards and evaluate state plans submitted 
for OSHA approval. A crying need exists for legally trained persons to 
oversee this activity and engage in advocacy before OSHA on behalf of 
workers. In addition, as the states develop plans under which they will 
reassume responsibility for worker safety and health, law students in every 
state could perform similar oversight and 2tdvocacy functions. This is an 
area ripe for the creation of clinical programs at law schools in state capitals 
and industrial cities around the country. 
IV. CoNCLUSION 
Books such as Expendable Americans and Muscle and Blood serve a 
useful, positive purpose in publicizing work]place casualties. The real need, 
however, is to go beyond descriptions of what is wrong, to hammer out 
specific strategies that will take into account the magnitude of the problem 
and the necessity of multiple approaches, and then proceed with the daily 
trench warfare of execution. It may take years before results surface, but 
the issue of occupational safety and health presents a challenge to whiCh 
there are no easy answers. 
87. Su Note, The New Public Interest Lawyers, 79 YALJ& L.J. 1069 (1970). 
88. For proposed solutions to the problem, see Sitkin tit Kline, Financing Public Interest Liti,ga-
tion, 13 ARIZ. L. REv. 823 (1971); Comment, The Private Bar, the Public Interest, and Tax In.cm-
tives: Monetary Motivation for Action, 13 ARIZ. L. REv. 9!53 (1971). See also Tucker, The Pnvate 
Lawyer and Public Responsibility-The Profession's Armageddon, 51 NEB. L. REv. 367 (1972). 
